Former military president, General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida, has disclosed that one of the reasons he led the overthrow of General Muhammadu Buhari as Head of State in 1985 was his holier-than-thou posturing.
Babangida, commonly called IBB, also alleged Buhari’s decision to spy on his calls, among other reasons, in his new book, “A JOURNEY IN SERVICE – An Autobiography.”
Babangida was Chief of Army Staff to Buhari, who had also ousted Shehu Shagari’s civilian government in the December 31, 1983 coup.
He said in the book that Buhari’s policies and leadership style also made him dissatisfied with the government.
Babangida alleged that Buhari and his then deputy, Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon, carried themselves as saints and monopolised power to the exclusion of the rest of the military.
The book read, “After the military coup that replaced the civilian government of Shehu Shagari with a military regime led by Major General Muhammadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida assumed the role of Chief of Army Staff.
“However, he became increasingly dissatisfied with the Buhari government’s policies and leadership style, which he believed were detrimental to the nation’s progress. This dissatisfaction eventually led to its ouster in 1985, and he took office as the military president.”
Babangida said tension had begun to build up since the start of the year in which Buhari was overthrown, and a change in leadership had become necessary.
The former Nigerian leader further said the coup that brought Buhari into office, which he described as a “rescue mission”, had derailed, with the military at the risk of splitting.
In his 1985 maiden address to the nation, reproduced in the book, Babangida said Buhari was “too rigid and uncompromising in his attitudes to issues of national significance”.
He added that Idiagbon “was similarly inclined in that respect” and “a combination of these characteristics in the two most important persons holding the nation’s vital offices became impossible to contend with”.
Babangida said action had to be taken so as to rebuild the hopes of Nigerians, hence, the ousting of the Buhari military regime.
Explaining the justification, Babangida said, “The change in leadership had become necessary as a response to the worsening mood of the nation and growing concern about our future as a people.
“All through the previous day, as we flew from Minna and drove through Lagos towards Bonny Camp, I was deeply reflecting on how, we, as a nation got to this point and how and why I found myself at this juncture of fate.
“By the beginning of 1985, the citizenry had become apprehensive about the future of our country. The atmosphere was precarious and fraught with ominous signs of clear and present danger.
“It was clear to the more discerning leadership of the armed forces that our initial rescue mission of 1983 had largely miscarried. We now stood the risk of having the armed forces split down the line because our rescue mission had largely derailed.
“If the armed forces imploded, the nation would go with it, and the end was just too frightening to contemplate. Divisions of opinion within the armed forces had come to replace the unanimity of purpose that informed the December 1983 change of government.
“In state affairs, the armed forces, as the only remaining institution of national cohesion, were becoming torn into factions; something needed to be done lest we lose the nation itself.
“My greatest fear was that division of opinion and views within the armed forces could lead to factionalisation in the military. If allowed to continue and gain root, grave dangers lay ahead.”
Continuing, he explained, “My predecessor in office, Major General Muhammadu Buhari, and his deputy, Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon, had separated themselves from the mainstream of the armed forces by personalising what was initially a collective leadership.
“They both posted a ‘holier than thou’ attitude, antagonising the civil populace against the military. Fundamental rights and freedoms were being routinely infringed upon and abused.
“As a military administration, we were now presiding over a society that was primarily frightened of us. We were supposed to improve their lives and imbue the people with hope for a better future.
“Instead, we ruled the nation with a series of draconian decrees. An administration intended to reflect the collective will of the armed forces as a national institution came to be seen as the private personal autocracy of a stubborn few.
“Like most military coups, our leadership change was informed by widespread disquiet among the civil populace. Ordinary people were experiencing severe economic hardship. The general economic and social conditions the people lived under were worsening by the day.”
Talking about the economy, Babangida said essential goods and supplies were scarce, “Yet arbitrary controls in all aspects of economic life and an ancient resort to barter in international trade meant that the nation’s financial woes would not end soon.
“Draconian decrees led to the abuse and severe limitation of basic freedoms as people were clamped into indefinite detention, most times for minor infractions. Punishment for crimes against the state had led to the pursuit of mechanical legalistic justice against the dictates of natural justice.
“As the Chief of Army Staff, I was under undue pressure from the rank and file to seek ways of reconnecting the government to society lest we lose the nation itself.”
He also stated that the “queue culture” economic policies of the Katsina-born ex-military ruler collapsed because he failed to address fundamental economic principles.
Babangida argued that while Buhari and his boys maltreated Nigerians as they queued for essential items, which were rarely available, he did not resolve the issue of supply of these commodities.
Buhari was generally regarded as having floated the “War Against Indiscipline” mantra in his first coming as military leader between December 31, 1983 and August 27, 1985, when citizens were made to queue for basic items, like milk and cooking oil, at the stores.
Babangida said when he tried to raise the issue, he was regarded as an enemy of the regime. He stated that he felt personally assaulted that some Nigerians who possessed little quantities of foreign currencies were picked up by the government at the airports.
According to the book, “A considerable propaganda project was born. Under the War Against Indiscipline (WAI) programme, people were compelled to wait patiently in queues, even for services and goods we knew were in inadequate supply. Our people obeyed the queue culture and became generally orderly in public places.
“On the surface, this attracted temporary populist acclaim. It was an achievement, some of whose benefits have survived, but it did not address the economy’s fundamental supply and demand crisis. It was and remains my belief that queues will disappear when you adequately supply the market.
“While some appearance of order was achieved in the short run, the fundamental social anarchy remained untouched because its economic root cause remained unaddressed.
“The primary cause of the crisis in the economy itself was a total mismatch of supply and demand. The shortage in the supply of essential goods was occasioned by uncertain access to foreign exchange.
“Scarcity of essential goods had remained the order of the day from our intervention in December 1983. The stores of the National Supply Company (NSC) had been forced open by the government, and the contents auctioned off to the people. There was no alternative strategy to replenish these stocks. Acute scarcity was nationwide.
“Endless queues continued at distribution centres for essential goods like sugar, cooking oil, baby formula and grains. Reports from major population centres indicated that soldiers and police officers were ill-treating people in these queues even if they could not be assured of getting the supplies even after waiting for hours.
“As a government, all my predecessor and his deputy could offer the people was a forced queue culture. An orderly queue with no incentive or reward at the other end was a ritual in futility. Those of us who pointed out this futility were regarded as regime enemies. Therefore, I was convinced that a more fundamental solution and decisive change were required.”
While Nigeria’s economic problems required reflective thought, rather than knee-jerk populist reflexes, Babangida said under the Buhari military regime, the nation’s economy was based on government and public sector dominance.
He said there was excessive control of the major sectors of the economy, from retail trade, shipping, aviation, banking, to even social services, with the government becoming the effective driver of economic life.
A common characteristic of the many government-owned and controlled companies, he said, was that they were loss-making and wasteful.
He wrote, “Essential goods and supplies were scarce. Yet arbitrary controls in all aspects of economic life and an ancient resort to barter in international trade meant that the nation’s financial woes would not end soon. Draconian decrees led to abuse and severe limitations.
“I must confess that I felt assaulted and hurt that my predecessor had arrested, detained and harassed some prominent Nigerians because they were found at the airport travelling with a few dollars or pounds sterling. The cases of the famous musician Fela Ransome Kuti and Chief Harold Shodipo were of particular public interest.
“We reviewed all such cases and set those wrongly held free. People could now access foreign exchange and source goods at the prevailing market rate. Manufacturers, traders and general providers of goods and services took advantage of the liberalised environment. That was how we solved the problem of scarcity of essential commodities and ended the queues. It was a hard choice.”
Discussing the integrity of the armed forces at the time, he said, “On several occasions and instances, even the very integrity of the armed forces was being called into question.
“A disciplinary case involving allegations of divided interest against some senior officers was decided without due recourse to the Army Council.
“Instead of waiting for a report and investigation from the Army leadership, the affected officers were unceremoniously relieved of their commission, and their military career of so many years was abruptly ended without any input from the Army as their institution of origin.
“I objected to this arbitrariness and disregard for due process. I confided in some senior colleagues that I would rather resign my commission than continue in office as Chief of Army Staff without input into decisions that concern the careers of personnel under my command.”
On a personal note, Babangida said, “In response, I was placed under surveillance, with the privacy of my communications and those of my family constantly monitored. This tense atmosphere culminated in the unanimous decision of a broad spectrum of senior and middle-level officers to change the nation’s leadership.
“The processes associated with this change were completed without bloodshed by midnight on August 26, 1985. ON AUGUST 27, 1985, I assumed office as the nation’s new leader, fully aware of the many challenges confronting the country.
“I had no illusions about the direction in which to move the country. I had long-standing convictions about Nigeria born of many decades of comprehensive consultations with a broad spectrum of compatriots from nearly all walks of life.
“Having been part of all previous government changes, I had become quite familiar with the wishes and aspirations of our people and developed a template of what needed to be done, at least from my modest perspective.
“The new administration’s determination was informed by a genuine desire to end the cycle of instability in both the politics and general history of the nation. I made this clear in my inaugural address to the nation.”
The former military leader also expressed regrets about leaving behind the late General Sani Abacha, as the most senior military officer to work with the Interim National Government led by Earnest Shonekan, describing his action as a “grave mistake”.
Babangida denied knowing or having anything whatsoever to do with Association for Better Nigeria (ABN), led by Senator Arthur Nzeribe, whose activities contributed immensely to the annulment of the June 12 presidential election won by MKO Abiola.
He admitted in the book, “While mapping out our strategies for the way forward, our credibility deficit persisted, compounded by several seemingly unrelated events.
“In March 1992, a hitherto unknown group named Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) emerged, headed and funded, we later found out, by the wealthy Igbo maverick Arthur Nzeribe, calling for four more years for the administration.
“The emergence of the group personally took me by surprise. But we were, as a government, so immersed in our credibility crisis that no one believed that I, or a member of our government (at least, to my knowledge at that time), had a hand in the group’s activities.
“Especially, also, as Chief Arthur Nzeribe was personally known to me. It was difficult in the circumstances that we now found ourselves having to persuade an already sceptical Nigerian population that we were not behind the campaign for an extension to military rule.
“It was a bewildering experience, even more so because, as we later found out, ABN was not even a formally registered organisation then. As I will show later, figuring out the real forces behind this shadowy organisation took a long time.
“Our problem of what to make of ABN’s activities was compounded by behind-the-scene pressure from various groups, including the political class, for us to remain in office! Recall that the elected governors had assumed office in January 1992.
“Suddenly, in our search for a way forward, some of the governors who had been elected through a process that we were trying to fine-tune for the presidential elections were telling us, like ABN, to postpone the presidential elections. I was alarmed.
“Yet, the same governors (with the possible exception of one or two) went back to their party Conventions to say that I had a hidden agenda to extend my stay in power!
“At moments like that, being president of a beautiful country like Nigeria became frustrating. You wished you didn’t have to confront these challenges in those rare, lonely moments.
“But our challenges were far from diminishing. If anything, they multiplied. While still engulfed by the shadowy activities of ABN and troubled by the unsolicited ‘advice’ of some state governors to extend our stay in office, we were suddenly confronted in May 1992 by a wave of communal, industrial, labour and student unrest on a scale that was frighteningly disturbing.
“The communal conflict in Zangon-Kataf in Kaduna State quickly spread like wildfire to other parts of the state. In Lagos and other parts of the country, violent protests over the effects of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) had claimed lives.”
Babangida recalled the attempts made by Abacha and other unnamed senior military officers to truncate the transition programme at the time and confessed that he made a big gaffe by allowing the former head of state to remain in power after he left office in 1993.
He wrote, “Without question, one of my biggest headaches at this time was Sani Abacha. I knew that Abacha was ambivalent about a return to civil rule. But I thought, in retrospect now, naively, that he would support our transition to civil rule programme.
“As I said earlier, Abacha and I had come a long way. We were good friends, and he had, indeed, been nice to me. As I have said elsewhere, he saved my life once and also risked his life to ensure that I took over in 1985. I could never forget those details.
“I obviously didn’t know everything about him! For instance, I was alarmed to discover that he and a handful of others mobilised negative opinions against me within the military, portraying me as the problem. That campaign was geared towards a violent military coup to remove me as president forcefully.
“Without question, the idea of an ING was a contraption, something of a compromise between the fierce Abacha-led opposition to the June 12 election results and the position that the election results be allowed to stay, one that will succeed our government after the August 27, 1993, exit date.
“To legally actualise that decision, the government directed Professor Ben Nwabueze and Clement Akpamgbo to draft an enabling law, Decree 61 of 1993, the legal framework for the ING.
“Although the political parties had suggested a few other names for headship of the ING, we, as a government, were okay with letting the Transition Council Chairman, Chief Ernest Shonekan, head the ING.
“Desirous of not being a stumbling block of any type, and as a personal sacrifice, on August 17, 1993, I announced my desire to ‘step aside’ and go into retirement during my address to a joint sitting of the National Assembly.
“The outgoing government also felt that it would be proper for the Service Chiefs to retire, namely Lt-General Ibrahim, Air Vice-Marshal Akin Dada, Vice-Admiral Dan Preston Omatsola, and Aliyu Attah. One didn’t need to be a soothsayer or an astute political scientist to see that Chief Shonekan would have a tough time on the job.
“Although a former Chief Executive of UAC/Unilever, I feared he might lack the political astuteness to handle the impending national challenges. The situation was further complicated because, like Abiola, Shonekan was an Egba-Yoruba, which meant the new Interim government would be unpopular in Abiola’s strongest hold, southwestern Nigeria.
“Partly for the reasons stated above, we decided to provide adequate support to the new government by retaining critical top military officers from the outgoing Transitional Council I had headed, essentially as ‘enforcers’ for the new interim government.
“Accordingly, Lt-Generals Joshua Dogonyaro (as Chief of Defence Staff), Aliyu Muhammed Gusau (as Chief of Army Staff), and Brigadier John Shagaya (as GOC First Division) were retained.
“Problematic as it seemed, General Abacha also retained his position as the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff and, presumably, as enforcer-in-chief for the new government! But as we all now know, that was a grave mistake.”
On the political front, Babangida described Nigeria’s elite as hypocritical, stressing that their double-faced dispositions have not helped the country. He said the overthrow of democratic governments did not just happen without the nudging of politicians and the elite class.
With the possible exception of the Abacha coup of November 1993, Babangida stated that each military takeover was welcomed with jubilation and relish and, subsequently, legitimised by public opinion in ways that would have impacted the psyche of the military.
He stated, “And this brings me back to my earlier point: coups don’t just happen. The failure of civilian governments is the cause of coups. They derive from deplorable conditions created by a political leadership that abdicates its responsibility to the people.
“Conversely, the best antidote to coups is sound, transparent civilian governance that constantly reminds itself that governance’s prime purpose is the people’s welfare.
“Curiously, in witnessing the jubilation that accompanied military takeovers, I took away a few lessons from the hypocrisy of the political elite that recurred throughout my career.
“Some of the most vociferous opponents of military rule were those who first stepped forward to request and lobby for benefits from the system after successful military takeovers.”
After reflecting on the Nigerian situation for more than 30 years, the former military ruler concluded that human beings did not generally handle power well. He argued that only a vibrant civilian and civil society leadership as well as strong institutions could tame unbridled exercise of power.
He wrote, “Upon deeper reflection in retirement, I find myself going back to the lessons I first encountered at Jaji during my Senior Officers Course in 1977 and, subsequently, at Kuru in 1979 during my Senior Executive Course at the National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies, lessons which I never forgot even while in office.
“Namely, that, most times, human beings don’t handle power well, and the only guarantee against power abuse, in the absence of a vibrant civilian and civil society leadership, are effective and responsive institutions that can promote sustainable socio-economic development. Institutions matter even if building them in developing societies like ours takes time.”
